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The Struggle for Rents in a Schumpeterian Economy
A General Equilibrium Model
by Henri L.F. de Groot
1. Introduction.
Unemployment is currently seen as one of the most pressing economic problems that deserves to
be put high on the policy agenda of the European Community. At the same time, there is deep
concern about the relative position (in terms of, e.g., labour productivity) of Europe in the world-
economy. The OECD recently took a standpoint in the intriguing debate on these issues by arguing
that ‘Establishing a competitive environment could, therefore, improve job prospects by both
eliminating wage premia and encouraging output expansion’ (cf. OECD 1994c, p. 23 and 53).
From this policy prescription it seems as if there is a free lunch associated with strengthening
competitive forces in an economy as it might both foster economic growth and reduce unemploy-
ment. To assess the OECD argument, we will develop an endogenous growth model that enables
us to address the issues raised by the OECD in a consistent framework. From a theoretical point of
view, we contribute to the literature, as not many studies have appeared that allow us to assess the
interrelatedness of endogenous growth and unemployment in a general equilibrium framework.
The existence of large, non-competitive inter-industry wage differentials for the US has
convincingly been shown in a seminal paper by Krueger and Summers (1988). Other empirical
studies (e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989), Dickens and Katz (1987), and Gera and Grenier (1994))
have shown these differentials to be positively correlated with average firm size in the industry,
profitability of the industry, union density, and industry concentration. Furthermore, the wage
differential turns out to be stable over time and consistent between countries. The issue of
unemployment and its potential relation with economic growth is particularly interesting in Europe
where the unemployment problem is ‘probably the most widely feared phenomenon of our times. It
touches all parts of society’ (OECD 1994a, p.7). Various explanations for the difference in
unemployment performance between countries and over time have been proposed (e.g., Bean
(1994a and 1994b), and Layard et al. (1991)), among which the potential role of trade unions is
often stressed. Research on economic growth has seen a resurgence, both theoretically and
empirically, in questions on the role of institutions in determining the long-run wealth of nations.-2-
Somewhat undervalued is the potentially important role of labour market institutions. It is
especially in this area of research that we try to add to the existing theoretical literature, by
stressing the interrelatedness between labour market institutions, unemployment and growth.
In order to be able to achieve the goals set out above, we need a model that simultaneously
explains the existence of (i) non-competitive wage differentials, (ii) endogenous growth, and (iii)
unemployment. We therefore develop a two-sector endogenous growth model with a dual labour
market. The secondary, traditional sector operates under perfect competition and produces a
homogeneous good. The primary, high-tech sector produces various brands of a high-tech product.
Firms in this sector operate under monopolistic competition, and consequently earn a non-
competitive rent. Trade unions struggle on behalf of the production workers with the firm on the
division of this rent among the firm and the workers. This negotiation yields the unions part of the
non-competitive rent, which they distribute to the high-tech workers. High-tech workers thus
receive a non-competitive rent, which makes working in the high-tech sector more attractive than
working in the competitive secondary sector. Under some reasonable assumptions, this is shown to
generate ‘wait unemployment’ in equilibrium, i.e., workers queuing for high-tech high-paid jobs.
The model has Schumpeterian characteristics as the rate of growth crucially depends on the
opportunity of high-tech firms to make profits. Contrary to the common economic wisdom (as
expressed by, e.g., the OECD (1994)), concentration is shown to be good for growth and employ-
ment.
This model relates to existing theoretical literature in several ways. The labour-market
block of our model is inspired by a paper by McDonald and Solow (1985). They show that in a
dual labour market, where only the primary sector of the labour market is unionized and the
secondary sector behaves competitively, a non-competitive wage differential and equilibrium
unemployment arises.
1 The growth block is based on Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995). They
have incorporated the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge in a general equilibrium two-sector
endogenous growth model. The main contribution of our paper to the existing literature is that we
allow for the existence of equilibrium unemployment and endogenous growth in a general
equilibrium two-sector model. Most of the papers addressing the relationship between endogenous
growth and unemployment, use search-models of the labour market (e.g., Bean and Pissarides
(1993), Aghion and Howitt (1991 and 1994)). An efficiency wage approach to generate a
relationship between growth and unemployment is used in Van Schaik and De Groot (1995). Bean
and Crafts (1995) address the potential relationship between the operation of trade unions and
1 The main focus of McDonald and Solow (1985) is on the development of wages and employment
over the business cycle. We only deal with steady-state issues.-3-
economic growth.
2 We deviate from these previous studies by allowing the accumulation of firm
specific knowledge (resulting in endogenous growth) and the coming about of non-competitive
wage differentials due to the operation of trade unions (resulting in equilibrium unemployment) in
a dual labour market. A second theoretical contribution is related to the labour-market block of our
model. Dual labour-market models as developed by Harris and Todaro (1970) are often criticized
for unemployment being positively related to primary-sector employment (which is inconsistent
with empirical evidence; Lindbeck and Snower (1991)). Our general equilibrium model turns out to
overcome this unattractive feature.
We think that this model yields some useful insights for understanding the Post-WWII
development of Europe. This development is characterized by low unemployment and high growth
in the 1950s and 1960s, while the 1970s and 1980s saw high unemployment accompanied with
low growth rates. We argue that for understanding these developments, attention has to be paid to
(i) distortions in labour supply caused by the welfare states that came about in the 1960s and early
1970s, and (ii) the changing potential to grow due to diminishing catching-up possibilities.
Combination of these two factors is argued to be a potentially important explanation for European
stagnation since the early 1970s.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the consumer and producer
behaviour in our model, which is inspired by an endogenous growth model with firm specific
knowledge as developed by Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995). This section mainly serves for
setting the stage of the model. The central and most innovative part of the paper is in section 3
where we extensively discuss the labour-market block of our model. This section will be concluded
with a numerical example of the partial labour-market block. In section 4, we will start with a brief
discussion of the growth block of the model. Then we will simulate the complete model and
present some numerical simulations. Section 4.3 contains some discussion on the potential
relevance of the model developed in this paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 Van der Ploeg (1987) develops a model in which the operation of a trade union is shown to lower
investment and the capital stock. The reason is essentially that the union’s promise of low future
wage demands, which is optimal ex ante as it encourages present investment in capital, is incredible.
The union namely has an incentive to renege on its promise once the capital has been installed. This
credibility problem generates an inefficiency caused by trade unions in terms of reduced output,
capital and employment. Endogenous growth is not considered in the model, however. This paper
will not deal with the credibility problems that potentially arise. We will model the unions as being
myopic in the sense that they disregard the effects of their wage claims on investment behaviour of
the firms. However, we do allow for the existence of endogenous growth.-4-
2. Consumer and Producer Behaviour.
We model a two-sector economy with endogenous growth. The producer and consumer behaviour
in such models is more or less standard in the literature on endogenous growth and discussed
extensively in, e.g., Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995), and Van Schaik and De Groot (1995).
We therefore restrict ourselves to a very brief description. This section only serves as a back-
ground.
Our economy consists out of two sectors, one high-tech and one traditional sector. In the
traditional sector, a homogeneous good is produced under perfect competition. In the high-tech
sector, n firms are operating, indexed i = 1,...,n. This number of firms is chosen to be exogenous.
We deliberately abstain in this paper from the complex issue of entry and exit behaviour and all
related strategic considerations. They are interesting in their own right (see for example Van
Schaik and De Groot (1995)), but not essential for the issues that we want to focus on in this
paper.
3 Each of these firms produces a unique brand of the high-tech good. Monopolistic competi-
tion prevails in this sector. We assume that a high-tech firm holds only a negligibly small market
share (n is supposed to be sufficiently large), so that competition is monopolistically à la
Chamberlin. There is only one homogeneous factor of production, viz. labour. Labour can be in
one of three potential states, viz. being employed in one of the two sectors or being unemployed. It
gets a ‘state specific’ payment (we will turn to this issue at length in the next section). Consumers
maximize intertemporal utility, where utility is derived from consumption of the goods produced in
the economy.
Consumer behaviour is summarized in Table 1. Consumers maximize their intertemporal
utility (C.1). They derive utility from consumption of traditional and high-tech goods (C.2).
Finally, consumers have a love for variety, indicated by (C.3). Performing optimization in three
steps yields the familiar Ramsey-rule (eq. 1), a spending rule showing that a fraction (1-s)o f
consumption expenditures is spent on traditional goods, and the demand function for a high-tech
good of variety i (eq. 4). Finally, we get a macroeconomic price index (eq. 3), and a price index of
high-tech goods (eq. 5).
Producer behaviour is summarized in Table 2. Producers in the traditional sector operate
under perfect competition and produce a homogeneous good with unitary labour productivity (eqs.
6 and 7). Firms in the high-tech sector maximize the present discounted value of all future profits
3 Another reason for this choice is that an exogenously given number of firms with persistent profit
opportunities matches real world phenomena quite well (see Mueller (1986)). Nevertheless, a world
in which profits are driven to zero by the process of entry and exit of firms may serve, in our
opinion, as a useful theoretical benchmark.-5-
(P.1), subject to the production function (eq. 8), the accumulation of firm specific knowledge (eq.
9), and the demand function for the brand of the variety it produces (eq. 4). Optimization yields
mark-up pricing (eq. 10), a static condition for optimal investment in R&D (eq. 11), and a dynamic
equation governing the allocation of high-tech labour over time (eq. 12).-6-











A: wealth q: subjective discount rate
c: composite consumption good 1/r: intertemporal elasticity of substitution
I: income other than rental income : elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods ( >1)
n: number of high-tech firms s: share of high-tech goods in utility (0<s<1)
Pc: macroeconomic price index
pxi: price of high-tech good of variety i
PX: price index of high-tech goods A dot over a variable represents a derivative w.r.t. time
PY: price of traditional good
r: nominal interest rate
U: utility index
xi: volume of high-tech good of variety i
X: composite of high-tech goods
Y: volume of traditional goods-7-















h: high-tech labour productivity x: productivity parameter in R&D
Lf: fixed cost (e.g. management)
Lr: research labour
Lx: high-tech production labour
LY: traditional labour
ph: shadow price of investment in R&D
wx: wage rate in high-tech sector
wY: wage rate in traditional sector-8-
3. The Labour Market of the Model.
In this section, we will state the labour-market block of our model. Section 3.1 discusses union
behaviour. This union behaviour is shown to result in a non-competitive wage-differential in
section 3.2. Equilibrium unemployment is derived in section 3.3. We end with the presentation of
an illustrative numerical example of the partial labour-market equilibrium in section 3.4.
3.1 Union behaviour.
We assume that in each monopolistically competitive high-tech firm, a trade union is operating.
The union and the firm play a game on the division of rents generated by the production of the
differentiated high-tech good. For simplicity, we assume that the union only represents the
production workers who are currently employed (an assumption that seems to match reality rather
well). The objective of the union is to extract as much of the rents generated in the high-tech firm
as possible. By making this choice, we abstain from several interesting issues related to the
operation of trade unions. For example, this choice of the objective function neglects the apparent
fact that unions care about, e.g., the macroeconomic unemployment rate, the income distribution,
lay-off criteria, unemployment insurance, working conditions, and their membership (we refer to
e.g., Oswald (1985) and Layard et al. (1991) for extensive discussions on the potential objectives
of trade unions). For our aim, the simple way of modelling a union’s preferences is, however,
sufficient. It captures the idea that we have in mind, namely that trade unions are mainly after the
extraction of economic rents, aimed at furthering the interest of workers in the firm.
In pursuing rent maximization, the union has to outweigh the positive effect of wage
increases with the negative labour demand effect, induced by the lower product demand following
a price (wage) increase. The firm on the other hand wants as low a wage as possible (in order to
keep as much of the rents as possible). The ultimate outcome of this ‘struggle for rents’ is deter-
mined on the basis of negotiations between the union and the firm. The bargain between the firm
and the union is modelled as follows:
This is the so-called Nash bargain, or ‘right to manage’ approach to bargaining between trade
(13)
unions and firms. The parameter g reflects the relative bargaining power of the firm, O reflects the
alternative or outside wage for a high-tech production worker, and pi is the firm’s profit in case no-9-
agreement is reached in the bargain. An important point to mention is that the union and the firm
do not bargain over employment levels (as is assumed in efficient bargaining models (e.g.,
McDonald and Solow (1985)). The reasons for not using an efficient bargaining approach are
twofold. First, we find the efficient bargaining approach unrealistic from an empirical point of
view, as it does not correspond to the observation that employment is usually set unilaterally (e.g.,
Oswald (1987), and Clark and Oswald (1989)). Secondly, an efficient bargain model is incentive
incompatible, as a firm always has an incentive to renege on the bargained outcome once the
bargain has been settled, by choosing labour demand on the demand curve (Oswald (1985)).
The maximand in the Nash bargain depends crucially on three factors. The first is the
relative bargaining power of the parties engaged in the bargain, g. This relative power depends on
the eagerness with which the firm wants to reach an agreement (relative to the unions eagerness).
The second factor is the union’s objective in the bargain, (wxi-O)Lxi. The union thus wants to
maximize the wage bill over the alternative income of the production workers in the firm. It might
alternatively, without affecting the main results, aim at maximizing the income of all workers
employed in the firm. The third term represents the operating profits of the firm, net of the outside
profit that prevails if no agreement is reached. Without loss of generality, we assume pi=0 in the
remainder of this paper (see footnote 4). We could, alternatively, use the firm’s total profits in the
bargain. This will not affect the main results, though it complicates the expressions to be derived
considerably (the main effect of using total profits is that the bargained wage is lowered as the
firm is more resistant to wage increases as these increases also have to be paid to the research and
‘fixed’ workers).
Log-linearizing the Nash maximand and taking the derivative w.r.t. the wage rate yields the
first order condition for a maximum
Using the envelope theorem (¶pi¢ / ¶wxi =- L xi), and
(14)
which can be derived using the demand function for a good of variety i, leaves us, upon combina--10-
tion with (eq. 14), with
4
3.2 The non-competitive wage differential.
After having determined the wage on the basis of the bargain described above, the firm extends the
wage rate to the managers and research labourers (that is, the wage which is agreed upon for the
production workers also applies to non-production workers in the firm). Though simplifying, this
assumption seems justified. Empirical research has shown that if one occupational group in a
certain firm or industry is highly paid, then workers in other occupational groups in that same firm
or industry are also highly paid (e.g., Dickens and Katz (1987) and Dell’Aringa and Lucifora
(1990)).
5 This evidence points to the existence of rent sharing. Furthermore, the firm unilaterally
chooses its employment level (the ‘right to manage’ approach) with the objective of maximizing
the present discounted value of the firm (see Table 2).
Using the mark-up of the wage rate over the alternative wage, we can now characterize the
non-competitive wage differential. In the remainder of this paper we will assume the alternative
wage to be equal to the unemployment benefit.
6 This benefit is paid out of lump sum taxes and
4 Not making the assumption of zero ‘opportunity profits’ leaves us with the following result for the
mark-up
This solution is intractable analytically. The comparative statics results are, however, in line with
results described earlier. The only important difference is that the mark-up is lower the higher the
outside option per production worker for the firm. The reason for this is simply that a high outside
option makes the firm more resistant to high wages and increases the threatpoint of the firm.
5 Lindbeck and Snower (1990) develop an insider-outsider model to explain this phenomenon
(together with the existence of non-competitive wage differentials). There is an issue of aggregation
here. We assume in our model that wages are extended to managers and research labourers at the
firm level. The empirical studies referred to look at the correlations of wage premia for different
groups at industry level.
6 Alternatively, we could model the alternative wage as a weighted average of the unemployment
benefit and the wage rate in the traditional sector, where the weights are determined on the basis of
the probability that one ends up in one of the two states (i.e., unemployment or employment in the
traditional sector). This would, however, complicate the analysis without altering the qualitative
results.-11-
equals a fixed proportion (b) of the wage in the traditional sector. We can then derive the relative
wage (w)
7
We thus see that a non-competitive wage differential arises due to the operation of trade unions.
(15)
This wage differential is smaller, the higher the relative bargaining power of the firm. This is
intuitively clear as the firm has no interest at all in paying high wages.
8 An increase in the
elasticity of demand of the high-tech product will decrease the wage differential. The reason for
this is that as competition between high-tech firms becomes tougher, the union is hurt more in
terms of a loss in employment when it increases its wages. This leads to more modest wage claims
by the union. Finally, an increase in the unemployment benefit increases the wage differential. This
is due to the fact that increased benefits improve the union’s bargaining position as the ‘fall-back
earnings’ of the production workers (the earnings in case no agreement is reached and the worker
becomes unemployed) are better.
From the previous description of union behaviour, it has become clear that the trade union
is able to extract part of the firm’s rent and distribute this among the workers in the high-tech firm.
Such a union is absent in the traditional sector, resulting in a non-competitive wage differential
between the high-tech and the traditional sector. Our division of sectors in a high-tech, unionized,
imperfectly competitive sector with high-paid jobs, and a competitive, traditional sector with low-
paid jobs closely resembles the distinction made by Doeringer and Piore (1971) between the
primary and secondary sector (see also Dickens and Lang (1988) for a description of the renais-
sance of segmented labour-market models). In the real world, one can think of the primary sector
as being the high-tech industrial sector, while large parts of the service sector possess the attributes
of the secondary sector (Bluestone and Harrison (1988)). Furthermore, the distinction matches the
empirical literature on wage differentials quite well. This literature shows non-competitive wage-
differentials to be most prominent in imperfectly competitive and profit making industries.
7 Note that we assume symmetry between high-tech firms so we can skip the firm-indices. From this
point on, we assume (1-b)( +g( -1)) < 1 (to guarantee w>1, as is consistent with empirical
evidence).
8 This might change when efficiency wage considerations are allowed to play a role in the model
(see, e.g., De Groot and Van Schaik (1995) for a two-country endogenous growth model where such
considerations turn out to be crucial in determining equilibrium unemployment and the relative
labour productivity of countries).-12-
3.3 Equilibrium unemployment in a dual labour market.
An essential characteristic of our model described so far is its dual labour market. The trade union,
operating in the high-tech sector, extracts rents from the firms in the process of bargaining with the
firm. This leads to primary-sector workers receiving a non-competitive rent (w>1). As workers are
striving for the highest possible pay-off, all workers would in principle like to be employed in the
high-tech sector. The number of jobs in this sector is, however, restricted. We assume that at some
exogenous rate d jobs in the high-tech sector fall free. Upon being laid-off, a worker faces two
options. He can either decide to allocate himself to a job in the traditional sector (these jobs are
freely available), or he can allocate himself to the pool of unemployed. In determining his optimal
strategy, the worker has to take the following two considerations into account: (i) the earnings rate
when being unemployed is lower than the earnings rate when being employed in the traditional
sector (b<1), and (ii) the probability of entering the high-tech sector from the secondary sector
(aq) is lower than from unemployment (q). The process of outweighing the two opportunities that
laid-off high-tech workers are facing finally results in a (endogenously determined) probability (h)
of going to one of the two states (i.e., the state of unemployment or traditional sector employment;
see Hansen (1985)). After having chosen this probability, the workers are distributed randomly.
The outcome for this probability is such that ex-ante laid-off workers are indifferent between the
two options that they are facing.
9 Over their whole lifetime, all workers earn the same (in
expected terms). A perfect insurance market guarantees that all consumers can consume their
optimal amount each period.
In Figure 1, we depict the labour market and the flows on this market in a stylized way.
Note that in equilibrium, there is no incentive to alternate between equilibrium strategies that have
been made. Take, for example, a worker who is in the traditional sector. Being in that sector has
some value for him, and this value is composed out of current and future earnings. In equilibrium,
this value is the same as the value that unemployed workers derive from being unemployed. Now
suppose that a traditional sector worker moves to the pool of unemployed. The effect of that move
is that the value of being unemployed goes down as more unemployed people are competing for
the high-tech jobs falling free, reducing the probability of entering the high-tech sector (this
9 An alternative way of looking at this process is the following. Each period, dLT persons are laid-off
in the high-tech sector (where LT is high-tech employment and equals, by definition, n(Lx+Lr+Lf)).
They form a coalition and aim at maximizing the total discounted future pay-off for the group as a
whole. This maximum is reached for some division of the laid-off workers over the two states. After
having determined this optimal division, members of the group are allocated randomly (but
according to the optimal division) over unemployment and traditional sector employment.-13-
probability, q, is determined endogenously in the model). Moving from traditional-sector employ-
ment to the pool of unemployment is therefore no strategy that will be chosen in equilibrium (and
vice versa). We can thus neglect flows between traditional-sector employment and unemployment.
Figure 1. Labour-market flows
The assumption of the unemployed having a higher probability of entering into the high-tech sector
than workers in the traditional sector (a<1) is crucial for our model and intensively debated (and
used as a working hypothesis) in the literature (e.g., Bulow and Summers (1986), Burda (1988),
Calvo (1978), Harris and Todaro (1970), McCormick (1990), Taubman and Wachter (1986)).
Reasons that we can advance are (i) that a secondary-sector worker has less time to search for a
high-tech job (which is often argued to be questionable from an empirical point of view as
unemployed persons appear to spend only little more time on searching for jobs than employed
workers, and on-the-job search is a very natural phenomenon), (ii) that a high-tech firm is less
inclined to offer a secondary-sector worker a job than an unemployed person as acceptance of
secondary-sector work is conceived as being a bad signal (e.g., McCormick 1990), (iii) that
secondary-sector employment ‘scars’ workers by reducing their trainability and punctuality (e.g.,
Doeringer and Piore (1971)). Lindbeck and Snower (1991) give a critical discussion of the Harris
and Todaro types of theories and provide alternative explanations for the coexistence of a perfectly
competitive secondary sector and equilibrium unemployment. These alternatives use heterogenous
preferences (for example some workers disliking secondary-sector jobs more than others), or-14-
heterogenous productivities or endowments to explain the coming about of unemployment.
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Though the assumption made is not without problems, we still feel comfortable with its use as a
working hypothesis (see also Burda (1988), Clark and Summers (1979) and Pissarides (1988) for
empirical support for our choice).
To formalize the determination of the labour-market equilibrium, we now introduce three
value functions (Bellman equations; see, e.g., Pissarides (1990)). Let VY, VU, and VT denote the
present discounted value of expected income streams of, respectively, a worker in the traditional
sector, an unemployed, and a worker in the high-tech sector. The worker in the traditional sector
enjoys a wage rate of wY from working and he expects in unit time to get a job in the high-tech
sector with probability aq, which yields him a surplus of VT - VY over his current position. VY thus
satisfies
where rVY is, in a perfect capital market, the valuation put on having a job in the traditional sector
(16)
(this job may be seen as an asset). This valuation equals the return on the traditional sector job.
This equation can also be written as
According to this formulation, the present discounted value of being in the traditional sector equals
the present discounted value of the wage earned in the current position (which is assumed to be
paid at the end of the period) plus the expected value derived from the state the worker is in
during the next period. With probability aq the worker gets a job in the high-tech sector (which





Note that the workers discount their income at the nominal interest rate r, as they can freely save
(18)
10 Another line of reasoning that can also explain the existence of wait unemployment relies on
subjective factors. Waiting for a high-tech job in this view is preferred if the utility from unemploy-
ment benefits and status effects associated with a primary job exceeds the utility derived from a
secondary sector job (this is worked out in a formal model by Van de Klundert (1990)). Using such
a framework (instead of the assumption that the probability of getting a high-wage job is lower
when being a secondary sector worker) would not alter the main results of the model.-15-
and borrow at the financial market at the nominal interest rate. This enables them to smooth their
consumption profile over their lifetime (note that over their whole lifetime, all consumers earn the
same amount of money in expected terms). For equilibrium to hold, we require throughout that the
value of a job in the traditional sector equals the value of being unemployed







Finally, we have to impose a stock-equilibrium condition
(22)
so total labour supply (L) is either employed in one of the two sectors or unemployed. This labour-
(23)
market block of the model yields a relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of
high-tech workers as a function of the relative wage differential (w), the unemployment benefit (b),
the acceptance rate of a worker in the traditional sector (a), and the discount rate (1/(1+r)). We
recall that the division of laid-off high-tech workers over unemployment and the traditional sector
(h) is determined endogenously, as well as the probability of entering the high-tech sector (q).
The resulting unemployment in our model has to be thought of as wait unemployment.
That is, part of the labour force is deliberately queuing for the high-paid jobs. In the dual structure
that we have in our model it is impossible to call this type of unemployment either voluntary or
involuntary. It is voluntary in the sense that the unemployed could, in principle, choose to be
employed in the traditional sector. They decide not to do so as this is not in their economic
interest. It is involuntary, however, as all the unemployed are willing to accept a job in the high-
tech sector, but are not offered such a job because of the rationing that is going on in that sector.
We, in other words, do not argue that unemployed are lazy and are simply not willing to accept a
job. However, unemployment should not only be seen as a demand-side problem. It also results
from distorted supply due to the availability of generous benefits (see Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1996)). Burda (1988) forcefully argues that wait unemployment, which has to be understood as a
sort of investment decision, is useful in understanding the recent development of unemployment in-16-
Europe. Some empirical evidence for this view is given in his paper. Other evidence comes from
Clark and Summers (1979) who argue that primary-sector workers who are laid off are unlikely to
accept secondary-sector jobs and prefer to wait for a new high-paid job to become available. Still
another source of evidence is provided by Pissarides (1988) who shows, on the basis of the Labour
Force Survey in Britain of 1984, that there are more unemployed job seekers than employed ones,
as is consistent with the idea of wait unemployment. There is, however, no general consensus on
the importance of wait unemployment in the literature.
At this point, one can think of various extensions that might enrich the labour-market
block of the model. One could think of, e.g., the probability (q) of finding a job in the high-tech
sector being negatively dependent on the time that one has spent looking for such a job. This
would enable us to capture the issue of long-term, persistent, unemployment due to, for example,
obsolescence of skills. We could also allow for a positive value of leisure enjoyed when unem-
ployed, heterogeneous labour where part of the labour force is simply unwilling to accept a job in
the secondary sector (cf. McCormick 1990), status effects associated with being employed in the
primary sector, unemployment benefits being partly indexed on past earnings, the relative
bargaining-power of unions being negatively dependent on the macroeconomic unemployment rate,
etc.. These extensions will modify the results of the model but still, the basic economic forces (i.e.,
workers having an incentive to allocate themselves towards unemployment when laid-off and wait
for a high-tech job as this is in their own economic interest) described in this paper remain at
work.
3.4 A numerical example.
To give a good insight into the model developed in this paper, we will present the partial equilib-
rium model of the labour-market block. This labour-market block is the most innovative part of
this paper and a good understanding of this block is required to grasp the working of the general
equilibrium model (to be discussed in section 4.2). The partial labour-market model that will be
discussed in this section consists of equations (16)-(21) and (23). We add the wage equation
w=Wb, and goods-market equilibrium LY=zLT to complete the model. The wage equation is a short-
hand notation of eq. (15), so the parameter W reflects, among others, the relative union power and
the demand elasticity of high-tech goods. The goods-market equilibrium can be understood as a
simplified representation of consumer behaviour, as represented in Table 1. As consumers have
Cobb-Douglas preferences, they spend fixed shares of their income on traditional and high-tech-17-
goods. This results in an equilibrium allocation of employed labour over the two sectors. The
stronger the consumers prefer traditional goods over high-tech goods, the higher the parameter
z.
11 So we have a partial equilibrium model with nine equations and eleven unknowns (VY, VT,
VU, LT, U, LY, wx, wY, r, q, and h). We take the wage rate in the traditional sector as a numéraire
(wY=1). The nominal interest rate is exogenously determined.
In the remainder of this subsection, we will distinguish two scenarios. The first is
characterized by high growth and interest rates.
12 We will call this the ‘high-growth scenario’.
The second is characterized by a low growth rate (the ‘low-growth scenario’). In our numerical
simulations we will take values for the nominal interest rate of 10% and 5%, respectively. The
other parameters of the model are chosen to equal
z=1.1, a=0.3, d=0.3, W=1.25, b=0.9.
The results of the numerical simulations for our base run under the two scenarios are summarized
in Table 3. Furthermore, the Table contains the comparative statics results for a 1% increase in
unemployment benefits (b) and the parameter W (which can be thought of as an increase in the
relative bargaining power of trade unions).
11 An important remark is that, as we assume z>0, an increase in LT is (given the labour-market
constraint (23)) associated with a decrease in unemployment in our partial equilibrium model. This
is in sharp contrast with the often criticized characteristic of partial Harris-Todaro models in which
unemployment and high-tech employment move in the same direction. We return to this issue when
describing the results in our general equilibrium model (in section 4.2). It will turn out that the
relation between high-tech employment and unemployment can either be positive or negative.
12 Note that the growth and interest rate are, in the general equilibrium model, positively linked by the
Ramsey rule, which is left implicit in this partial equilibrium model (see Van Schaik and De Groot
(1995) for an extensive discussion of the general equilibrium characteristics of the growth-block of
our model).-18-
Table 3. The high and low-growth scenarios.
High-growth scenario Low-growth scenario
base W +1% b +1 % base W +1% b +1 %
High-tech Employment (LT) 45.4 -2.6 -5.6 44.2 -2.9 -6.2
Traditional Employment (LY) 50.0 -2.6 -5.6 48.6 -2.9 -6.2
Unemployment (U) 4.6 +54.2 +115.5 7.2 +37.4 +79.3
Wage differential (w) 1.13 +1.0 +1.0 1.12 +1.0 +1.0
Allocation parameter (h) 0.77 -12.0 -23.1 0.67 -12.0 -23.0
Acceptance probability (q) 0.70 -12.0 -23.1 0.61 -12.0 -23.0
‘Unemployment rate’ U/LT 0.10 +58.3 +128.2 0.16 +41.4 +91.1
Note: The base-run values are in absolute values, while the comparative statics values are in percentage changes from the
base-run.
We can conclude from Table 3 that under the high-growth scenario, high-tech employment is only
slightly higher than under the low-growth scenario, while unemployment is significantly lower.
There is, in other words, a negative relationship between growth and unemployment. This result
can be understood as follows: with relatively high growth and interest rates, future earnings are
relatively heavy discounted. In other words, much weight is put on current earnings. This implies
that laid-off high-tech workers have a relatively strong incentive to allocate themselves into the
direction of traditional sector employment (as this yields relatively high current earnings). The
allocation parameter h is therefore relatively high under the high-growth scenario, resulting in
relatively low equilibrium unemployment and an increased effective supply of labour (defined as
(L-U), which is evenly distributed over the two sectors, given the operation of the goods-market
equilibrium).
The comparative statics results are intuitively clear. An increase in unemployment benefits
affects the allocation of labour in two ways. Firstly, it reduces the cost of waiting for a job in the
high-tech sector as an unemployed person. Consequently, more laid-off high-tech workers allocate
themselves in the direction of the pool of unemployed (h decreases). This reduces the effective
supply of labour (L-U) and consequently reduces the employment in both sectors. Secondly, the
increase in benefits increases the threatpoint of the trade union and thereby leads to a higher wage-19-
differential. This increases, ceteris paribus, the attractiveness of a future job in the high-tech sector
which results in more people allocating towards the pool of unemployed as this yields the highest
probability of a future high-paid job.
In case the relative bargaining power of the trade union (represented by W) increases, only
the second effect described previously is operating. The increase in relative power increases the
wage differential, increasing the attractiveness of a future job in the high-tech sector and resulting
in higher unemployment and reduced effective labour supply.
A final remark to be made is that under the high-growth scenario, results are much more
sensitive to shocks. The reason for this is that under the high-growth scenario the interest rate is
high, increasing the discounting of future revenues and making people more sensitive to changes in
current earnings.
4. Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment.
This section is divided in three subsections. Section 4.1 very briefly presents a partial model in
which the equilibrium rate of growth is derived for an exogenously given rate of unemployment
(as extensively discussed in the previous section). In section 4.2 we come to the discussion of the
complete model. We will simulate the model and present some comparative statics results. The
overall results are in line with the results presented in section 3.4 and 4.1. Of course, some minor
modifications have to be made in the general equilibrium context. This gives rise to some
interesting results. Section 4.3 discusses the potential relevance of the model developed in this
paper by assessing its usefulness for explaining the Post-WWII development of Europe in terms of
growth and unemployment.
4.1 Endogenous growth in a dual economy.
In section 3.4, the interest rate was assumed exogenous. For understanding the determination of the
equilibrium growth and interest rate, we will now focus on the growth block of our model. This
will be done on the basis of a partial equilibrium model where U/LT, which results from the labour-
market equilibrium, is taken to be exogenous and equal to µ. The partial model further consists of
equations (1)-(12), (15), (23), and a steady-state definition. We describe and solve the model in
Appendix A. The equilibrium growth rate of the model is shown to equal-20-
This formula reveals the growth rate to depend negatively on the relative wage rate and the rate of
unemployment (as a fraction of high-tech labour). In other words, the equilibrium rate of growth is
crucially dependent on labour-market institutions. The less costly it is to become unemployed (e.g.,
through a generous welfare system, strong labour unions, etc.) the lower the rate of growth. This
can be understood as more unemployment lowers the effective supply of labour. This makes each
firm in the high-tech sector smaller in size. Consequently, both the fixed and the quasi-fixed cost
of R&D expenditures can be spread over less output. This reduces the incentive for high-tech firms
to engage in R&D and in turn lowers the equilibrium rate of growth. Furthermore, the rate of
growth negatively depends on the fixed cost of the firm. The reason for this has already been
given. In Van Schaik and De Groot (1996) we elaborate on the importance of these fixed cost in a
two-sector two-country endogenous growth model.
4.2 The complete model.
In this section, we undertake a numerical simulation. The parameter values that we use in our base
run are
n=100, x=0.35, s=0.5, r=6, q=0.02, =2, b=0.9, g=2.6, a=0.3, d=0.3, Lf=0.1
The results for the base run are in Table 4.
13 In turn, we performed some comparative statics. The
results are also in Table 4 (in percentage changes).
13 We can compute border-line values for, e.g., b, g, n, x, and s for which the unemployment rate is
zero (assuming the other parameters to be equal to their base-line values). This is instructive for it
once again shows that unemployment does not solely result from distortions on the labour market,
but is also related to the situation on the goods-market. This is of course due to the general
equilibrium characteristics of our model. The border-line parameters are computed as b=0.886,
g=3.174, n=45.53 (we ignore the integer problem), x=1.143 and s=0.356.-21-
Table 4. The general equilibrium model.
base (1-b) -1% g +1% n -1% x +1%
High-tech employment (LT) 39.703 -0.636 +0.440 -0.026 +0.070
Traditional Employment (LY) 52.553 -0.679 +0.390 +0.209 +0.016
Unemployment (U) 7.744 +7.866 -4.903 -1.282 -0.469
Nominal interest rate (r) 0.080 -0.789 +0.546 +1.221 +1.016
Growth rate (g) 0.024 -1.053 +0.729 +1.628 +1.355
Allocation parameter (h) 0.671 -2.756 +1.767 +0.493 +0.160
Acceptance probability (q) 0.507 -2.714 +1.818 +0.257 +0.214
Research intensity (Lr/Lx) 0.300 -0.265 +0.181 +0.402 +0.335
Wage differential (w) 1.150 +0.111 -0.156 0.000 0.000
Average firm size (LT/n) 0.397 -0.636 +0.440 +0.984 +0.070
‘Unemployment rate’ (U/LT) 0.195 +8.557 -5.320 -1.256 -0.539
Note: The base-run values are in absolute values, while the comparative statics values are in percentage changes from the
base-run.
A first important remark regarding the results is that high-tech employment and unemployment do
not always move in the same direction in our general equilibrium model. This is contrary to the
Harris-Todaro type of models. Lindbeck and Snower (1991) criticize the Harris-Todaro types of
models for this feature as it is inconsistent with empirical evidence. Our general equilibrium
framework turns out to overcome this unattractive feature. This result points to the importance of a
sound general equilibrium framework in which also demand and supply considerations are taken
into account when analyzing the effects of, for example, policy changes (Lindbeck and Snower
(1991) point to the importance of these general equilibrium effects but do not model them
explicitly). In our model, general equilibrium characteristics may go somewhat at the expense of
microeconomic rigour of the model. This is, however, an inevitable trade-off that one is facing in
macroeconomic model-building. Especially the fully fledged demand and supply side of our model
and the resulting endogenous determination of the nominal interest rate (in combination with the-22-
labour-market block) is crucial for understanding the development of the allocation of labour in our
model.
A second general remark is that the ‘unemployment rate’ (U/LT) and the interest rate (r) are
consistently negatively related. This result was already implicitly pointed at in section 3.4, where
we showed growth and unemployment to be negatively related in the partial labour-market model.
This result stands upright in our fully fledged model.
Table 4 reveals some interesting conclusions. First of all, an increase in unemployment benefits is
shown to increase unemployment and decrease the growth rate. The main factor in explaining this
result is the distortion in the supply of labour caused by the increased benefits. The increased
benefits reduce the cost of waiting in unemployment for a job in the high-tech sector.
Consequently, more laid-off workers allocate themselves into the direction of unemployment (h
decreases). This effect is reinforced by the benefits improving the threatpoint of the trade union
and thereby increasing the bargained relative wage. In turn, the increased relative wage increases
the attractiveness of a future high-tech job, leading more people to move towards the pool of
unemployed. This results in a lower effective supply of labour. Consequently, employment
decreases in both sectors. Given the number of firms, average firm size goes down in the high-tech
sector. Research cost can therefore only be spread over less output, reducing the incentive to
engage in R&D as well as the equilibrium rate of growth. A further effect explaining the huge
increase in unemployment is related to the decrease in the interest rate. Due to this decrease, less
weight is put on current earnings and more laid-off high-tech workers consequently decide to
allocate themselves into the direction of unemployment, reinforcing the two effects described
before. A similar kind of reasoning holds for an increase in the relative bargaining power of the
trade union (a decrease in g).
A second interesting result is that an increase in concentration in the high-tech sector (a
decrease in the number of firms, n) turns out to be good for growth and employment, while it
leaves the wage differential unaffected. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast with the analysis
made in the OECD Jobs Study (1994) where increasing competition is argued to reduce non-
competitive wage differentials and thereby reduce unemployment and increase output expansion.
This result can best be understood as follows. As some firms leave the market (n decreases), the
market share that is left for each firm individually increases. This in turn increases the average
firm size, ceteris paribus. The consequence of this is that the fixed cost (Lf) and the quasi-fixed
cost of doing research can be spread over more output, increasing the incentive for a firm to
engage in R&D. The growth rate is consequently fostered (along with the interest rate). An-23-
important remark is that this conclusion is of course conditional upon the fact that a decrease in
competition is assumed not to lead to decreased efficiency in the high-tech firms. We thus do not
claim that decreased competition is, without any doubt, good for economic growth. We do want to
stress, however, that a Schumpeterian kind of process is also at work when the intensity of
competition is altered. This may lead to positive growth and employment effects of decreased
competition. A further effect of increased concentration is that the overall size of the high-tech
sector decreases; the increase in average firm size is more than offset by the decrease in the
number of firms. To understand the change in the unemployment rate, it is essential to notice the
increase in the equilibrium rate of interest. This increase decreases the importance attached by
workers to future payments. A laid-off worker is therefore less inclined to accept a current low
payment (bwY instead of wY) in exchange for a higher future probability of a well-paid job (q
versus aq). More laid-off workers therefore choose to accept a job in the traditional sector instead
of becoming unemployed (h increases).
We will finally discuss the effects of an increase in productivity in the research sector (for
example due to increased catching-up possibilities; we will come back to this issue in section 4.3).
Such an increase is shown to increase the growth rate and decrease equilibrium unemployment.
The essential reason for this is that the increase in R&D productivity increases the incentive to
engage in R&D (Lr/Lx increases). This increases the equilibrium rate of growth and the total size of
the high-tech sector. Accompanied with the increased growth rate, also the equilibrium interest rate
increases. This decreases the importance attached by the workers to current earnings and results
into more laid-off high-tech workers allocating towards the traditional sector (h increases).
4.3 General discussion.
The model that has been developed in this paper is essentially characterized by the endogenous
determination of (i) economic growth, (ii) non-competitive wage differentials and (iii) unemploy-
ment. A crucial role in this model is played by trade unions that struggle with high-tech firms
about the rents generated by those firms. The outcome of this struggle was shown to be an
important determinant of equilibrium growth and unemployment.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper to the existing literature is, in our view, that
this model enables us to address the pressing problems of unemployment and economic growth in
a single, coherent framework. This places some results obtained on the basis of partial equilibrium
models in a different perspective, and sometimes even gives rise to different conclusions (for-24-
example the Harris-Todaro result of unemployment and high-tech employment always being
positively related is modified due to the working of the general equilibrium model).
The results described in section 4.2 might be useful for a better understanding of the Post-
WWII performance of European countries. In our opinion, two crucial factors have been at play in
this period, namely the development of the generous welfare state and the changing potential for
Europe to catch-up in terms of productivity with the United States. The welfare state as the
crucially important factor in the European unemployment problem is often neglected. The standard
argument being that the timing of events has been wrong; during the building up of the welfare
state, unemployment remained constant at low levels, while in the period that the generosity of the
welfare state was stabilizing, unemployment levels increased to unprecedented levels. This
argument has recently been challenged by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1996). According to them, the
huge availability in the early postwar period of good jobs concealed the inherent instability in the
European economies caused by the development of the welfare states. Once the economies were hit
by adverse shocks (for example the oil crisis and the restructuring of the economy from manufac-
turing towards the service sector) the ‘time bomb’ of the generous welfare state came to explode.
We subscribe to the importance of supply-side factors determining unemployment in explaining the
relative growth and employment performance of countries (see also De Groot and Van Schaik
(1995)). The way in which the generosity of the welfare state affects the outcome of the economic
process in our model has extensively been described in previous sections.
14 Contrary to the
Ljungqvist and Sargent paper, our model also allows us to assess the effects of the welfare system
on economic growth.
15 A second crucial factor in our opinion for understanding European
economic performance is the ‘catching-up factor’. The 1950s and early 1960s were characterized
14 Benefits in our model should be thought of in a very broad sense. They in principal include
eligibility criteria, duration of the benefit, social acceptance of making use of these benefits,
institutional arrangements, etc. This complicates addressing the effects of benefits on unemployment
(especially empirically). It is very hard to come up with a good measure of generosity of the welfare
system, including all these aspects.
15 Another important aspect in which our model differs from the Ljungqvist and Sargent model relates
to the general equilibrium characteristics of our model. Good jobs in our model are situated in the
high-tech sector. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1996) argue that the restructuring from the manufacturing
to the service sector (and especially the economic turbulence associated with this restructuring) may
have contributed to increased unemployment. In our general equilibrium model, however, this need
not be the case. The restructuring from manufacturing to services has, in our opinion, largely been
driven by demand factors (e.g., Cornwall and Cornwall (1994)). Such a change in demand structure
(s decreases in our model) will lower economic growth and the size of the high-tech sector. The
effect on equilibrium unemployment now depends on two countervailing effects. There is the
decrease in the interest rate which is fostering unemployment, but on the other hand there is the
shrinking high-tech sector which reduces the probability of getting a job in that sector and thereby
reduces unemployment.-25-
by a huge potential to imitate the United States and to catch-up in terms of labour productivity.
This is the period of historically unprecedented economic growth. The high growth rates were
associated with low unemployment. Although the welfare state was built up in that period and
increased the inherent instability of the system, unemployment remained low. The inherent
instability of the system was, in other words, concealed by the process of catching-up. In our
model, this can be represented by a relatively large value of the productivity parameter of the
research sector (x). As the potential to catch-up petered out in the early 1970s, growth in the
European countries decreased (x decreased). This in turn may have led to increases in unemploy-
ment (see Table 4).
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5. Conclusion.
This paper has developed an endogenous growth model in which trade unions are allowed to play
an important role. These trade unions aim at extracting rents generated in the growth generating
high-tech sector. This behaviour results in a non-competitive wage differential, which is shown to
yield an incentive for people to wait as an unemployed person for a job in the high-tech sector.
Numerical simulations lead us to the conclusion that increased concentration of high-tech firms
fosters economic growth and decreases the rate of unemployment. This result is in sharp contrast
with the general notion on increased competition as expressed by, e.g., the OECD (1994), and is
largely due to the Schumpeterian flavour of our model. Another result that has been derived is that
strong unions and generous unemployment benefits are indeed bad for economic growth. By
increasing the non-competitive wage differential they increase the incentive for laid-off high-tech
workers to become unemployed, reducing the effective labour force and consequently reducing the
growth potential of an economy.
In the end we can draw the conclusion that labour-market institutions, among which trade
unions are one of the most important, can be of crucial importance for understanding (i) unemploy-
ment performance, as well as (ii) the growth potential of an economy. This second conclusion is
underestimated in economic research so far. Future research, both theoretically and empirically,
might benefit from recognizing this conclusion. To our view, a good understanding of the growth
performance of countries, both in absolute and in relative terms, requires an understanding and
recognition of the importance of labour-market institutions.
16 This reasoning is worked out in a formal model in Van Schaik and De Groot (1996).-26-
Appendix A. Endogenous growth in a dual economy.
This appendix solves the partial endogenous growth model discussed in section 4.1. The model




We only solve for the steady-state in which it holds per definition that
(A.2)
In addition, from the eqs. (2), (3), and (5), it can be derived that the steady-state circular flow
(A.3)
equilibrium is characterized by
17
From equations (2), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (A.2) we derive goods-market equilibrium
(A.4)
Combination of eqs. (23) and (A.1) yields
(A.5)
Substituting out px/ph using eqs. (10) and (11) from eq. (12) and using the steady-state definitions
(A.6)
(A.3) and (A.4), and eq. (9) we can derive
Combining the steady-state definitions with eq. (1) we get
(A.7)
We can now derive the equilibrium number of high-tech production workers (Lx) by putting (A.5)
(A.8)
and (A.6) equal and using (A.7), (A.8) and the definition for LT (=Lx+Lr+Lf)a s
17 Note that we use the symmetry assumption throughout in this appendix. This allows us to write the
expenditures on high-tech goods (XPX)a snxpx.-27-
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